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From Activism to Annoyance 
Framing, Threat, and Public Tolerance Toward Protest 
 
Samuel E. R. Dunham 
College of William & Mary 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Media representation of political protest has become increasingly dismissive and negative since the 1960s (Di Cicco 
2010). News media frame protest using the protest paradigm, which highlights the spectacle of a protest instead of 
its goals (McLeod 2007; Dardis 2006). In the past few decades, however, the public has become more tolerant 
toward protest. This experiment investigates a potential micro-level mechanism through which the protest paradigm 
might increase tolerance toward protest by undermining its perceived effectiveness.  
  
The study creates two treatments by manipulating the intensity of the protest paradigm frame in a Washington Post 
article about the Occupy Wall Street movement. Results from a Mechanical Turk experiment show limited support 
for the proposed mechanism. Respondents treated with the high-intensity frame article feel less threatened by the 
Occupy Wall Street protest and are more tolerant toward the protesters; however, these treatment effects do not 
extend to participants’ evaluations of a hypothetical protest by either their most or least favored political group. The 
article treatment has no impact on participants’ attitudes towards protest generally; asking participants to imagine a 
hypothetical protest by their least favored group, however, decreases their tolerance toward protest as a whole. 
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Introduction 
 
Media outlets use framing to dismiss, undermine, and misrepresent political protest. 
Political science, sociology, and communications literature term the common use of such frames 
the “protest paradigm” of news media. This paradigm represents protest as bothersome, 
unserious, and an illegitimate form of social expression (McLeod 2007; Di Cicco 2010; Dardis 
2006). Longitudinal data suggest that such nuisance-based framing dominates media discussion 
of protest, and that media use of this framing paradigm has increased since the 1960s (Di Cicco 
2010). 
 Nationally representative mass surveys, however, suggest that members of the public 
have become more, not less, tolerant of protest in the past few decades. Public tolerance toward 
anti-war protests, for instance, has steadily increased since the Vietnam era (Page & Shapiro 
1992; Gallup 1993; Gallup 2003). Tolerance toward demonstrations and political speech by 
controversial groups has also risen: the public is more likely to tolerate controversial speech from 
socialists, Communists, atheists, and other such groups today than they were in the 1960s (Page 
& Shapiro 1992). Evidence from the General Social Survey also indicates a large increase in 
tolerance toward political protest generally in the past few decades. Only around 36.6% of GSS 
respondents in 1985 indicated that public demonstrations against the government should be 
“definitely allowed.” This proportion had jumped upward by 2006: 52.9% of respondents 
indicated that these demonstrations should definitely be allowed (General Social Survey, 1985 – 
2006).  
The contradictory trends of public tolerance and news coverage of protest seem striking, 
and the causal mechanisms driving this contradiction remain unclear. Public tolerance toward 
protest and representation of protest in the news media may be linked: the protest paradigm and 
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associated “nuisance coverage” may have had a positive impact on public tolerance toward 
protest. Alternately, the public might simply be more tolerant toward the types of groups that 
protest in the contemporary era than groups that protested in the past. 
This study investigates the micro-level, psychological links between the protest paradigm 
and tolerance toward protest. It presents the results of a survey experiment exploring a possible 
tie between the protest paradigm and tolerance: threat perception. The protest paradigm might, 
by representing protest as an ineffective nuisance, reduce the perceived threat posed by 
demonstrations as a tool for political change without changing perceptions of the protest’s goals 
themselves. 
The experimental design tests links between the protest paradigm, tolerance, and two 
types of threat. The first threat type, goal threat, measures respondents’ attitudes toward protest 
goals. The second threat type, strength threat, measures respondents’ perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the protest. These measures draw from work on threat and tolerance by Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus (1993). The study treats subjects with either a news article highly 
characterized by the protest paradigm frame (a “high-intensity frame” article) or an article in 
which the protest paradigm is muted (a “low-intensity frame” article). Both treatment articles 
were based on an article about an Occupy Wall Street demonstration in the Washington Post. 
The study then tests the effects of this treatment in three different contexts. First, the study 
measures treatment effects on attitudes toward the protest depicted in the article. Then, the study 
incorporates a least-favored groups analysis, similar to that proposed by Sullivan, Piereson, and 
Marcus (1993), by asking participants to evaluate a protest by either their most or their least 
favored political group. Lastly, the study measures respondents’ attitudes toward protest 
generally to test whether respondents retained the effects of the treatments. 
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The results from the article-specific section of the experiment conflict with the results 
from the sections incorporating least-favored groups analysis. Participants’ responses support the 
proposed model when evaluating the Occupy Wall Street protest presented in the article. The 
protest paradigm has little impact on goal threat perceptions but has a significant impact on 
strength threat perceptions. Results from this section also strongly suggest that exposure to a 
high-intensity protest paradigm frame increases tolerance toward protest. When evaluating a 
hypothetical protest, however, attitudes toward the goals of the protesters overpower article-
based treatment effects. The study finds no article treatment effects in the hypothetical section, 
finding instead that respondents across treatment groups respond much less tolerantly toward 
protests by groups they dislike. This result provides some support for an alternate mechanism 
whereby protest group identity (and respondents’ threat reactions to their goals) impacts 
tolerance more than protest strength. Lastly, some effects from the hypothetical section of the 
experiment carry over into responses to generalized questions. Results suggest that respondents 
take mentally-available examples of protest into account when evaluating their tolerance toward 
protest generally. 
 
Literature Review 
Literature linking protest and news media emphasizes the power that media outlets hold 
over the public’s perception of political protest. Modern protest tactics depend on the media to 
represent and disseminate their message (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993; Lipsky 1968; Oliver & 
Maney 2000; Smith et al. 2001; Oliver & Meyer 1999; Hall 2011). Protest movements depend on 
favorable presentation in the media, and the above literature finds that protesters often mold their 
message and methods to appeal to what they gauge as universal interests. Despite their radically 
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opposed viewpoints, both left- and right-wing protest movements appeal to patriotism, love of 
country, and favorable comparisons to US historical figures to forward their goals (Hall 2011).  
Media outlets themselves, however, are not always amenable to protesters’ causes. A 
large body of literature describes how news media often hamper the attempts of protesters to 
highlight or advance their own viewpoints (Gitlin 1980). Attention-getting strategies—designed 
to increase the likelihood of media reportage on a protest event—damage protest effectiveness 
when used by media outlets to characterize the protest as a whole (Gamson & Modigliani 1987; 
Shoemaker 1982; Shoemaker & Reese 1996). As Smith et al. (2001) explain, “Even when 
movement organizers succeed at obtaining the attention of mass media coverage, the reports 
represent the protest events in ways that neutralize or even undermine social movement 
agendas.” This neutralization and control is often accomplished through the use of framing 
techniques.  
 
Framing Effects 
 
 Media outlets frame when they “process” details of events as they report on them, sorting 
their subjects into preconceived, commonly-understood categories. Unlike agenda-setting, which 
modifies the frequency at which certain issues and debates are reported upon (Price & 
Tewksbury 1997; Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007), framing changes the representation of stories 
already chosen as worthy of coverage without altering or undermining their basic facts (Gitlin 
1980; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Media frames instead adjust the salience of these facts by 
linking them with different problems or conflicts (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson & Oxley 1999; 
Entman 1993). Individual consumers of media then integrate media frames into their own 
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characterizations of issues and debates; linkages between atomized facts help media consumers 
form narratives, opinions, and, indeed, conceptions of reality (Scheufele 1999; Entman 1993). 
Media frames help both news outlets and individuals make sense of what Edelman (1993) terms 
an “unstable social world.” 
The media tend to use issue frames, instead of equivalency frames, when describing 
protest. Equivalency frames date back to the earliest conceptions of framing developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1983). Under this formulation, subjects respond to different 
explanations of specific facts because of the suggestions or impacts of words used in the 
different explanations. For instance, respondents receive a program more favorably when it is 
described as “saving” 200 out of 600 people than when it is stated that, under the program, 400 
people will die. Issue frames apply more broadly than equivalency frames. In an issue frame, 
some actor (usually a media outlet or political interest) “defines and constructs a political issue” 
to guide subjects’ thinking about that issue (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson 1997). These frames 
themselves usually “carry evaluative content”; that is, the frames suggest some conclusion about 
the issue (for example, a policy or principle that should be applied in connection with the issue) 
as they define the issue itself (Slothuus 2008).  
 Empirical literature confirms the prevalence of media usage of issue frames to 
characterize a wide range of debates and issues. Literature mapping the coverage of international 
politics in the Cold War era, for instance, demonstrates that the media chose between presenting 
events in relation to the balance of power between the USSR and the US and framing the conflict 
as a humanitarian issue (Entman 1993).  Another body of literature establishes connections 
between framing and affirmative action debates. Survey respondents in studies by Gamson and 
Modigliani (1987) and Arriola and Cole (2001) alternately frame affirmative action as a remedy, 
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a threat to political liberalism, or a clear example of “preferential treatment.” Other examples of 
empirical support for framing theory include alternate media frames of nuclear power (Entman & 
Rojecki 1993), terrorism (Altheide 1982; Nacos & Torres-Reyna 2005), and election campaigns 
(Iyengar 1994).  
Experimental literature also confirms that media frames impact perceptions of issues 
within controlled settings. Nelson et al. (1997), for instance, investigate framing effects of 
television stories on a Ku Klux Klan protest. Subjects viewing media that framed the protest as a 
part of a free speech controversy proved much more likely to demonstrate tolerance towards the 
KKK marchers than subjects exposed to a story emphasizing threats to public order. 
Experimental literature further explores framing effects and affirmative action: numerous studies 
find differences in attitudes toward affirmative action between groups exposed to differing media 
frames (Kinder & Sanders 1990; Fine 1992). A study by Kinder and Sanders, for instance, finds 
that framing affirmative action as either an unfair advantage or reverse discrimination impacts 
white opinion; it also changes the types of antecedents whites incorporate into the formation of 
their opinions (Kinder & Sanders 1996; 192). 
 
The Protest Paradigm and Public Nuisance Paradigm Frames 
 
A particular type of issue frame, called the protest paradigm, consistently appears in 
media reports of protest. Media devote less attention to the goals or ideologies behind the protest 
movement, instead casting the protest itself as the relevant issue in the story. Chan and Lee 
(1984) originally coined the plural term “protest paradigms” in a study describing how media 
outlets used framing to support or delegitimize Hong Kong protest groups. The currently best-
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known conception of the protest paradigm, developed by Hertog and McLeod (1995), identify 
five characteristics of protest paradigm framing: the media represent demonstrations as circuses 
or carnivals, riots, confrontations, and—rarely—as debates. News reports more often 
characterize protests as unruly and unserious; lawless, confrontational, and unintellectual; 
unsupported by bystanders or statistics; and disapproved of by legitimate authority (McLeod 
2007; Dardis 2006; McLeod & Detenber 1999; Ismail et al. 2009). These characterizations pull 
political protests from the realm of debate, instead framing them as forms of deviancy and 
criminal unrest (Ismail et al. 2009). 
Content analysis studies suggest the pervasive use of the protest paradigm in media 
coverage of protest. Protest paradigm literature focuses on media representations of left-wing 
protest (Boykoff 2006; Hertog & McLeod 1995; Shoemaker 1984; Dardis 2006; Ismail et al. 
2009), though some research connects the protest paradigm to coverage of right-wing 
movements, like the Tea Party, as well (Weaver & Scacco, 2013). Protest paradigm coverage 
appears in news reports about anti-Iraq War demonstrations (Dardis 2006), anarchist or other 
“deviant” left-wing protest marches (McLeod & Hertog 1992;  
A complementary paradigm identified by Di Cicco (2010) attempts to differentiate the 
specific from the general. Di Cicco states that the media uses the protest paradigm to undermine 
specific protests; the public nuisance paradigm, however, undermines not only specific protests 
but protest as a whole. The public nuisance paradigm, Di Cicco states, applies to “news coverage 
of the idea of protest itself.” This paradigm deemphasizes the potential role protest plays as a 
legitimate or serious voicing of political views or grievances, instead characterizing it as an 
“irritation, a hindrance, something that interferes with daily life.” Though the distinction between 
the protest paradigm and the public nuisance paradigm appears somewhat unclear, Di Cicco 
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offers valuable criteria for evaluating the presence and intensity of protest-related paradigms by 
identifying three main delegitimizing tactics. By characterizing protests as bothersome, news 
outlets cast demonstrations as annoyances for the public and recreation for the protesters. 
Characterizing protests as impotent robs protest of legitimacy and perceived power to effect 
change. Representing protest as unpatriotic insinuates that protest as a whole actively harms the 
country. Combined, Di Cicco believes these characterizations undermine the public’s perception 
of the utility and legitimacy of protest as a whole. 
 
Counterintuitive Public Opinion Trends 
 
 The media regularly fit reports of protest within a protest paradigm, drawing on frames 
that delegitimize or undermine protest movements to characterize them as deviant. It follows that 
as the media has continued to frame protest negatively, public opinion and tolerance of protest as 
a whole would grow increasingly negative. 
 However, longitudinal data do not indicate a negative public opinion trend. Opinion polls 
suggest an opposite trend: public tolerance toward protest may have increased, not decreased, 
since the 1960s. The General Social Survey measures of public opinion toward the speech rights 
of groups typically associated with deviant protest (such as socialists and Communists) show that 
the public has become more, not less, tolerant of their speech (Marsden 2012; Page & Shapiro 
1992). GSS data also shows a marked increase in tolerance specifically toward protest and mass 
demonstrations since 1985 (General Social Survey, 1985 – 2006). Although asked during 
different wars, Gallup polls also show the US public as more tolerant of contemporary anti-war 
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protests (such as the first and second Iraq War) than they were of Vietnam-era protests (Page & 
Shapiro 1992; Hall 2012).  
The protest paradigm, however, is supposed to undermine political protest—not bolster 
support for it. Indeed, as McLeod (2007) states, the protest paradigm “generally disparages 
protesters and hinders their role as vital actors on the political stage [emphasis added].” If the 
protest paradigm truly damages public perception of protest, this counterintuitive shift in public 
opinion presents a puzzle to scholars of media and protest. That is, intuition suggests that this 
negative protest paradigm should negatively impact the public’s perception of protest, but the 
data suggest that the public’s tolerance toward protest remains unchanged—or perhaps has even 
increased. Though these data trends alone are not sufficient to conclude that public opinion of 
protest itself has improved—the public, for instance, could instead be more tolerant of the 
ideologies of modern protest groups—they do cloud conclusions typically drawn from the protest 
paradigm. 
Public opinion volatility does not provide an adequate explanation for this disconnect. 
Some older theories of public opinion suggest that the public cannot be said to truly “hold” 
opinions due to the volatility of public opinion survey data (Almond 1960; Crozier, Huntington 
& Watanuki 1975); other researchers dismiss the conception of public opinion as incoherent or 
non-existent (Zaller 1992), point out flaws in research methods (Schuman, Presser, & Ludwig 
1981) or redefine the very nature of public opinion (Page and Shapiro 1992). Thus public 
opinion shifts toward protest are likely not random; though, as stated previously, while the shifts 
themselves are not adequate to conclude that opinion toward protest itself has changed, they also 
cannot be dismissed categorically. 
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 The experimental literature on the protest paradigm and public nuisance paradigm also 
cannot provide adequate solutions to this puzzle. While some studies measure subjects’ attitudes 
toward specific protests after exposure to the protest paradigm, they remain inconclusive about 
how these attitudes carry over into general attitudes toward protest (Detenber et al. 2007; 
McLeod & Detenber 1999; McLeod 1995). McLeod and Detenber’s 1999 experiment, for 
instance, could not form solid conclusions regarding the relationship between support for 
political protest and the framing of an anarchist demonstration during a television broadcast. A 
study conducted by Detenber et al. investigating television framing of protests related to abortion 
performed (2007) also fails to find a clear negative influence of the protest paradigm on opinion 
toward the expressive rights of protesters. In fact, though no relationship between frame intensity 
and tolerance proved statistically significant, results for subjects exposed to stories about pro-
choice protesters indicated a slight increase in tolerance. 
 
Threat and Media Effects 
 
 Introducing threat as an intervening variable between frame exposure and tolerance levels 
could help clarify the muddied relationship between the protest paradigm and public attitudes 
toward protest (Sullivan et al. 1993; Marcus et al. 1995). The protest and public nuisance 
paradigms—traditionally seen as delegitimizing and undermining both protests and public 
support for them—may actually increase public acceptance of political protest as a tactic. As 
protests are seen as less and less of a political threat because of their increasing delegitimization, 
the public may have become more willing to tolerate them. This hypothesis runs parallel to key 
studies performed by Sullivan et al. (1993) and seminal work by Stouffer (1955) in which 
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subjects’ tolerance for certain movements (such as racist, Communist, or other disliked 
movements) depended heavily on how threatened they felt by the movements themselves. 
 Sullivan et al. and Marcus et al. also make key distinctions between types of threat. 
Building off of a 1978 National Opinion Research Center survey, Sullivan et al. sort seven threat 
scales into two factors. The first of these factors “evaluates[s] the goals of the target groups,” 
asking respondents normative questions about group dangerousness, integrity, and violent 
intentions; the second factor measures the “strength or importance of these groups” (Sullivan et 
al. 1993, 188; Marcus et al. 1995, 102). Sullivan et al. also find that these two factors vary 
independently; the correlation coefficient between these “goal threat” and “strength threat” 
measures is -.04.  That is, though grouped under the umbrella of “threat,” goal threat and strength 
threat are fundamentally different phenomena; a group can have normatively objectionable goals 
but have a low likelihood of implementing them. 
This study aims to connect research investigating the protest paradigm, threat, and public 
tolerance toward protest. Protest paradigm literature cannot account for the marked increase in 
tolerance toward protest, and no clear empirical link as of yet uses threat perception to link 
media framing effects with increased protest tolerance. This study investigates potential 
connections between these bodies of literature by testing linkages between threat, framing, and 
tolerance on the micro-level. 
 
Hypothesized Mechanism 
 The hypothesized mechanism proposes a micro-level link between the protest paradigm 
and public tolerance toward protest. An article with a more intense protest paradigm frame 
should negatively affect readers’ perceptions of the strength of the protest movement (termed 
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“strength threat”). It should not, however, impact how threatened readers feel by the goals of the 
movement (termed “goal threat”). This heightened frame should increase tolerance toward 
protest by way of the lowered strength threat. The diagram below presents a schematic of this 
proposed mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposed Mechanism: Protest paradigm lowers strength threat; lowered strength threat 
increases tolerance toward political protest. 
 
The study tests this proposed mechanism with three separate groups of post-test questions. 
 
Treatment effects on attitudes toward article 
 
 The article-focused section of the experiment asks participants about their attitudes 
toward the Occupy Wall Street protest described in the treatment articles. 
 Hypothesis 1.1: The article treatment will have no statistically significant effect on goal 
threat scores. 
 
 Hypothesis 1.2: Respondents treated with a high-intensity frame article will have lower 
strength threat scores than respondents treated with a low-intensity frame article. 
 
Frame 
Intensity 
Goal Threat 
Strength Threat 
Tolerance 
Toward 
Protest 
Lowered 
strength threat 
raises tolerance 
toward protest 
High intensity 
frame lowers 
strength threat 
No framing 
effect on goal 
threat 
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 Hypothesis 1.3: Respondents treated with a high- intensity frame article will have higher 
tolerance scores than respondents treated with the low-intensity frame article. 
Treatment effects on attitudes toward hypothetical protest 
 
This section of the experiment measures the effect of the article treatments on 
respondents’ attitudes toward a hypothetical protest. The study presents one treatment group with 
a hypothetical protest by their most favored group and asks the other treatment group about a 
hypothetical protest by their least favored group.  
Hypothesis 2.1: The article treatment will have no statistically significant effect on goal 
threat scores. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Respondents treated with a high-intensity frame article will have lower 
strength threat scores than respondents treated with a low-intensity frame article. 
 
Hypothesis 2.3: Respondents treated with a high-intensity frame article will have higher 
tolerance scores than respondents treated with a low-intensity frame article. 
 
Hypothesis 2.4: There will be positive interaction effects on tolerance between the high-
intensity frame article treatment and the most favored group treatment. 
 
Treatment effects on general attitudes toward protest 
 
 The last section of the experiment asks respondents about protest generally, testing 
whether either of the two treatments (article and movement) impact attitudes toward the 
phenomenon of protest itself—and whether interaction effects arise between the two treatments. 
 Hypothesis 3.1: The article treatment will have no statistically significant effect on goal 
threat scores. 
 
 Hypothesis 3.2: Respondents treated with a high-intensity frame article will have lower 
strength threat scores than respondents treated with a low-intensity frame article earlier in the 
study. 
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 Hypothesis 3.3: Respondents treated with a high-intensity frame article earlier in the 
study will have higher tolerance scores than respondents treated with a low-intensity frame 
article earlier in the study. 
  
Hypothesis 3.4: There will be positive interaction effects on tolerance between the high-
intensity frame article treatment and the most favored group treatment. 
 
 
Methods  
This study includes both a lab experiment and an experiment conducted online through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Both phases of this experiment test the effects of a 
treatment article on respondents’ attitudes toward political protest. The study heightens the 
intensity of protest paradigm frame in one treatment article and mutes the frame in the other 
article. The first portion of the study, involving a lab experiment, confirms that the high-intensity 
frame article aligns more closely with the protest paradigm than does the low-intensity frame 
article. The Mechanical Turk portion of the study tests the effects of the treatment articles on 
subjects’ attitudes toward protest. It also tests the effects of describing a hypothetical protest by a 
political group favored or disfavored by the respondent. 
The study derived the treatment articles from an article in the Washington Post covering a 
protest connected with Occupy Wall Street in 2012 (Washington Post 2012). The study selects 
this article because of its richness in statements that both align with and contradict the protest 
paradigm. The study codes each clause in the article using a coding method developed by Di 
Cicco (2010) to evaluate the presence of the public nuisance paradigm. Di Cicco’s study sets out 
three clear coding criteria that align closely with the protest paradigm. Coding assigns a positive, 
negative, or neutral value to each clause corresponding to whether or not it depicts the protest as 
bothersome, impotent, or unpatriotic. Clauses aligning with the paradigm receive positive values; 
clauses depicting the protest as not bothersome, effective, or patriotic receive negative values. 
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The study removes clauses with negative values from the high-intensity frame treatment article 
and removes clauses with positive values from the low-intensity frame treatment article. The 
study also edits for continuity and coherence and includes some additional quotes (such as a 
closing quote from a bystander summarizing the article). Appendix 3 presents the full texts of 
each treatment article as well as the text from the original Washington Post article. 
 
Lab Experiment 
 
A laboratory-based manipulation check conducted from October to December in Fall 
2014 tested the effects of the treatment article. The study recruited 162 undergraduate students at 
the College of William & Mary, a medium-sized, selective East-coast university in the United 
States. Subjects completed a pre-test before arriving at the lab. Upon arrival, subjects received an 
envelope containing one of three treatment articles. Two of the articles were manipulated with 
the coding method developed by Di Cicco described in the previous section; the third article 
presented the original text of the Washington Post article. After opening the envelope and 
reading the treatment articles, subjects completed a five to ten-minute survey questionnaire on a 
laptop provided by the lab. 
The results of the lab experiment show that the treatment articles fit the criteria of the 
public nuisance and protest paradigms as outlined by Di Cicco (2010). The high-intensity protest 
paradigm frame article presented the protest as more bothersome and less effective than did the 
low-intensity frame article. Table 1 presents a summary of this check below. Respondents 
conveyed their agreement or disagreement with statements about the treatment article by 
indicating their response on a seven point Likert scale (with a low score indicating low 
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agreement). The question regarding effectiveness was originally phrased to ask about 
ineffectiveness; these responses have been flipped. 
 
 
Table 1: Respondents’ Agreement with Statements About 
Treatment Articles (1 to 7 Likert Scale) 
 
High Frame 
Mean 
Low Frame 
Mean P Value 
Protest was Bothersome 3.93 3.25 0.05 
 (0.27) 0.22  
Protest was Effective 3.24 4.36 0.00 
 (0.23) (0.21)  
Protest was Unpatriotic 2.09 2.46 0.18 
 (0.19) (0.19)  
N 46 60  
 
Table 1: Manipulation Check Results. Each row represents a key aspect of media framing of political 
protest. 
 
Mechanical Turk Experiment 
 
 In March 2015, the study tested the effects of two experimental treatments, including the 
treatment articles described above, on a subject pool recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
service. Mechanical Turk (or “MTurk”) allows employers (or “requesters”) to contract out 
simple tasks to MTurk users (called “workers”) for a fixed payment per task. Quick recruitment 
of large, cheap recruitment samples makes it well-suited for survey research. Though Mechanical 
Turk cannot provide a truly random, representative sample, the diversity of potential subjects 
drawn from the pool of “MTurkers” who complete tasks through the site makes Mechanical Turk 
samples comparable, if not superior, to samples recruited on college campuses (Berinksy et al. 
2012; Buhrmester et al. 2011). 
18 
 
For the first test, subjects read one of two articles depending on their treatment group. 
The experiment randomly assigned subjects to read either the high-intensity frame or low-
intensity frame article. Of the respondents who successfully completed the survey, 504 
respondents received a high-intensity protest paradigm frame article, and 441 respondents 
received a low-intensity protest paradigm frame article.1 
 The second and third tests added a most and least-favored groups analysis similar to the 
analysis developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1993).2 After reading the treatment article 
and answering questions related to the article, the study described a hypothetical protest to the 
respondents. The description of this hypothetical protest explained that the protest would be very 
similar to the one about which they read but would involve a different protest group. The group 
involved was either the respondents’ most favored protest movement or least favored protest 
movement as indicated in a previous section in the survey. The study randomly assigned subjects 
to receive text describing a hypothetical protest about their most or least favored group, sorting 
the participants into two “movement treatment” groups of 464 and 481 respondents who 
successfully completed the survey. Then, after this second test, the study asked participants about 
their attitudes toward protest generally—that is, their attitudes toward protest as a whole, as 
opposed to their attitudes toward the protest in the treatment article or the hypothetical 
demonstration described in the movement treatment. 
 The study included these additional tests to gauge how subjects would translate their 
opinions toward the Occupy Wall Street protest described in the treatment articles to broader 
                                                 
1 The reasons for this imbalance in treatment group size are unclear; respondents who began the survey but either 
did not complete it or failed one of the two manipulation checks show a similar imbalance despite random 
assignment into treatment groups. 
2 Unlike studies that measure tolerance generally or toward one specific group (such as Communists), Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus measure a subject’s tolerance toward a group indicated by the subject to be their least-favored 
group.  
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opinions about protest. The second test, which introduced the hypothetical protest to the 
participant, analyzed how participants translated their views about a specific protest (described in 
the article) to views about a different protest. The third test took this process one step further, 
untethering the questions from any concrete example of protest. Results from the manipulation 
check indicate that respondents might remain unwilling to change their general opinions of 
protest during the experiment, even if they do take frames into account when evaluating the 
specific protest which the article discusses. This unwillingness to change is consistent with older 
literature about the protest paradigm (see Detenber et al. 2007). By asking participants to 
imagine a protest similar to the one about which they read (but conducted by a group about 
which they had strong attitudes), the study prompted them to take a “generalizing leap” without 
requiring them to change their preconceived, calcified views towards protest as a whole. The 
additional test also attempted to identify whether interaction effects would occur between article 
treatment and subjects’ attitudes toward the group protesting.  
Table 2 illustrates the two-by-two factorial design (article treatment by movement 
treatment) utilized in the experiment. 
 
Table 2: Two-by-two Factorial Design With 
Treatment Group Size 
 Protest Group Discussed in Hypothetical 
F
ra
m
e 
In
te
ns
it
y 
of
 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
A
rt
ic
le
 
 
High-Intensity Frame 
Most Favored Group 
N = 257 
 
High-Intensity Frame 
Least Favored Group 
N = 247 
 
Low-Intensity Frame 
Most Favored Group 
N = 207 
 
Low-Intensity Frame 
Least Favored Group 
N = 234 
Table 2: 2x2 Factorial design and N for each treatment sub-group. 
 
 
20 
 
Measurement 
 
 The study began by collecting information about subjects’ party affiliation, political 
involvement, and voter participation. The study then asked participants to select their most and 
least favorite political group or movement out of a list of ten groups.3 The study used these 
selections later when treating subjects with the presentation of a hypothetical protest scenario by 
either the subjects’ most or least-favored groups. The study then used a simple manipulation 
check to weed out inattentive participants. Respondents who passed the first manipulation check 
provided more demographic and background data (like age, gender, income, and political 
ideology) before receiving either the high-intensity or low-intensity frame treatment article. After 
reading the article, the study provided another attention check to eliminate participants who did 
not read the treatment article.  
The study then asked questions designed to test the links between the components of the 
proposed mechanism. The study adapted questions used in previous investigations of tolerance 
and threat.4 For each of the three sections of the survey (article-focused, hypothetical, and 
generalized), scales measured the three components of the proposed mechanism: goal threat 
perceptions, strength threat perceptions, and tolerance toward protest. Each of these scales was 
composed of subjects’ responses to five separate items presenting statements about protest; 
subjects indicated their disagreement or agreement with these statements on a 1 to 7-point Likert 
                                                 
3 The study derived a list of ten groups from a list of groups developed by Marcus et al. (1995, 102) for least-favored 
groups analysis. This list was updated with data about relevant political groups from the General Social Survey 
(2006; 2012). Appendix 1 presents a complete list of the groups used in this study. 
4 Work by McLeod and Detenber, two key contributors to the protest paradigm literature, provided the basis for 
questions related to tolerance (1999, 12). Questions measuring threat (and the distinctions between goal and strength 
measures of threat) were adapted from work by Marcus et al. and Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1995; 1993). 
21 
 
scale. Nine scales total and forty-five items total were therefore used in this study. Appendix 3 
presents a complete copy of the questionnaire presented to the Mechanical Turk participants. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Some variation in demographic characteristics exists across treatment groups. Many more 
men participated in the survey than women; this gender makeup conflicts with previous studies 
suggesting that women make up a larger proportion of the MTurk worker population (Berinksy 
et al. 2012; Buhrmester et al. 2011). Respondents were young to middle age and over half of the 
respondents fell within the bottom two income brackets ($20,000 a year and under and $20,001 
to $40,001). Table A1.2 in Appendix 1 displays a full tabulation of relevant demographic 
variables. Respondents disliked racist and religious extremist groups and favored more left-
leaning groups, like feminists and atheists, consistent with their low average conservatism score. 
Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 presents a full tabulation of respondents’ most and least-favored 
groups choices. Regressions displayed in this experiment include the variables displayed in 
Table A1.2 in Appendix 1. 
 
Results 
This section presents the results from the Mechanical Turk experiment in three parts. 
First, the report displays the results from the first test measuring respondents’ attitudes toward 
the protest depicted in the treatment articles (hereafter referred to as the “article protest”). Next, 
the report displays data measuring respondents’ attitudes toward a hypothetical protest by the 
respondents’ most or least favored groups. Lastly, the report discusses respondents’ attitudes 
towards protests in general. 
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Attitudes Toward Occupy Wall Street Treatment Article 
 
Figure 1: Graph of article treatment effects on means for each measure 
included in the proposed mechanism. Bar pairs 1 and 2 display the 
intervening variables measuring goal threat and strength threat; bar pair 3 
displays the article treatment’s effect on tolerance. Whiskers display a 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
The first group of scales measures respondents’ attitudes toward the specific protest 
mentioned in the treatment article. Hypothesis 1.1 predicted that there would be no significant 
difference in goal threat means between treatment groups—that respondents would find the goals 
of the Occupy Wall Street protest just as threatening after reading an article with a low-intensity 
frame as after reading an article of a high-intensity frame. The first row of Table 3 and the first 
pair of bars in Figure 1 show support for this hypothesis. There was no significant difference in 
the perceptions of goal threat between treatment groups when the questionnaire asked 
respondents about the article directly.  
Data also support Hypothesis 1.2, that respondents in the high treatment group would 
have lower strength threat scores on average than their counterparts in the lower treatment group. 
The second row of Table 1 shows a significant treatment effect on strength threat. Respondents 
in the high-intensity frame treatment group believed the protest movement depicted was weaker 
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and had a lower likelihood of influencing discourse and political decision-making, causing a .48-
point drop in the strength threat measure (p<.01).  
Lastly, the data support Hypothesis 1.3: respondents treated with a low-intensity frame 
article are less tolerant toward the protest described in the article than respondents treated with a 
high-intensity frame article. Row three of Table 1 and the third bar pair of Figure 1 compare 
respondents’ tolerance toward the protesters. The high-intensity frame article increased tolerance 
by about .58 points on the seven-point scale (p<.01).  
Table 3: Article Treatment Effects on Attitudes Toward Occupy Wall Street Protest 
 Treatment Group   
 
High Frame 
Mean 
Low Frame 
Mean 
Difference in 
Means 
P Value 
Goal Threat 3.26 3.29 -0.03 0.72 
 (0.05) (0.06)   
Strength Threat 3.93 4.41 -0.48 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.02)   
Tolerance 4.71 4.12 0.58 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.02)   
N 495 439 934  
 
Table 3: Tests of means between article treatment groups displaying the effects of the article treatment 
on goal threat, strength threat, and tolerance scales. 
 
In sum, data support each of the three hypotheses relating to participants’ attitudes toward 
the Occupy Wall Street protest described in the treatment articles and support the strength of the 
proposed model.  The significance of these results holds even when controlling for demographic 
variables (see multiple regressions in Tables A1.1, A1.2, and A1.3 in Appendix A). 
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Attitudes Toward Most and Least Favored Groups 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Graph of article treatment effects on means of 
attitudes toward hypothetical protest. Bar pairs 1 and 2 
display the intervening variables measuring goal threat 
and strength threat; bar pair 3 displays article treatment 
effect on tolerance. Whiskers display 95% confidence 
intervals. 
Figure 3: Graph of interaction effects between 
treatments on attitudes toward hypothetical protest. 
Lines represent article treatment groups. Whiskers 
display 95% confidence intervals. 
 
This section uses a two-by-two factorial design, introducing the movement treatment 
alongside the article treatment (received through the article treatment in the previous section). 
The movement treatment asks respondents to consider a hypothetical protest by either their most 
or their least favored protest movement as indicated in a previous section of the survey; the 
questionnaire automatically pipes the names and identities of these groups into the question text.  
The data support Hypothesis 2.1: the article treatment has no statistically significant 
effect on goal threat. However, subjects reading about their least favored group indicate they are 
much more threatened by the goals of the hypothetical protesters than do subjects reading about 
their most favored group. This alternate effect is large: there is a 3.28-point difference between 
the two movement treatment groups. 
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Table 4: Article Treatment Effects on Attitudes Toward a Hypothetical Protest 
 Treatment Group   
 High Frame Mean Low Frame Mean Diff. in Means P Value 
Goal Threat 4.09 4.14 -0.05 0.69 
 (0.09) (0.09)   
Strength Threat 3.80 3.83 -0.04 0.72 
 (0.06) (0.07)   
Tolerance 4.99 4.99 0.00 0.97 
 (0.08) (0.09)   
N 501 440 941  
 
Table 4: Tests of means between article treatment groups displaying the effects of the article treatment 
on goal threat, strength threat, and tolerance scales. 
 
Table 5: Movement Treatment Effects on Attitudes Toward a Hypothetical Protest 
 Treatment Group   
 Most Favored Mean Least Favored Mean Diff. in Means P Value 
Goal Threat 2.44 5.72 -3.28 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05)   
Strength Threat 4.56 3.11 1.45 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06)   
Tolerance 5.98 4.04 1.95 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.09)   
N 460 481 941  
 
Table 5: Tests of means between movement treatment groups displaying the effects of the movement 
treatment on goal threat, strength threat, and tolerance scales. Most Favored column displays means for 
subjects who considered a hypothetical protest by their most favored political group; Least Favored 
column displays means for subjects who considered a hypothetical protest by their least favored group. 
 
The data do not support Hypothesis 2.2. The article treatment has no effect on strength 
threat, as is shown in Table 2 and the second bar pair of Figure 2. The estimated difference in 
strength threat scores between article treatment groups is actually lower than the differences 
estimated for goal threat scores (.04 and .05 respectively). As in the previous paragraph, the 
movement treatment has large effects on strength threat. Whether this movement treatment-based 
difference—suggesting that participants believe groups they dislike are weaker than groups they 
like—arises from a clear evaluation of group strength or solely based on “wishful thinking” 
remains unclear. 
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Table 6: Effect of Treatments on Goal Threat, Strength Threat, and Tolerance Toward 
Hypothetical Protest Controlling for 4 Demographic Variables 
 Scales 
 Goal Threat Strength Threat  Tolerance 
Intercept 5.53 *** 2.55 *** 4.49 *** 
 (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.24)  
High Article Frame 0.16  0.10  -0.09  
 (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.14)  
Most Favored Group -3.22 *** 1.63 *** 1.96 *** 
 (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.15)  
High Intensity Frame x 
Most Favored Group 
-0.13  -0.32 * 0.00  
(0.15)  (0.17)  (0.20)  
Female -0.01  0.41 *** -0.17  
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10)  
Conservatism Score 0.05 ** -0.03  -0.24 *** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Income 0.00  -0.02  0.03  
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Age -0.03  0.03  0.27 *** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  
N 920  924  927  
R2 0.68  0.26  0.32  
 
Note: P<.01 = ***, P< .05 = **, P<.1 = * 
Table 6: Regression table showing effects of article treatment, movement treatment on goal threat, 
strength threat, tolerance toward a hypothetical protest. Treatments represented as dummy variables; 
also shows interaction effects. 
 
The data also do not support Hypothesis 2.3. The study finds no significant article 
treatment effects on tolerance toward a hypothetical protest. Again, the study does find large 
differences in tolerance between participants considering a hypothetical by their most favored 
political movement and participants considering a hypothetical by their least favored political 
movement. Exposure to a least-favored group hypothetical corresponds with a 1.95 drop in 
tolerance score (p<.01). This effect is consistent when controlling for demographic variables and 
occurs in both low and high-frame-treated respondents, as indicated by Table 6. The study finds 
no interaction effects between the two treatments, and so Hypothesis 2.4 cannot be. 
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Generalized Attitudes Toward Protest 
 
 
Figure 4: Graph of article treatment effects on means 
of attitudes toward hypothetical protest. Bar pairs 1 and 
2 display the intervening variables measuring goal 
threat and strength threat; bar pair 3 displays article 
treatment effect on tolerance. Whiskers display 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Figure 5: Graph of interaction effects between 
treatments on generalized attitudes toward protest. 
Lines represent article treatment groups. Whiskers 
display 95% confidence intervals. Note direction of 
interaction effect in most favored group treatment. 
 
 The data support Hypothesis 3.1. Tests of means find no significant article treatment 
effect on respondents’ general attitudes toward protest goals. Interestingly, participants evaluate 
the goals of protesters as slightly—though significantly—more threatening if they considered a 
hypothetical about their least favored group earlier in the experiment (p<5%). Table 7 shows the 
roughly .16-point difference in goal threat scores between most and least favored treatment 
groups. Despite these relationships, perceived goal threat from protesters remains low regardless 
of treatment groups, hovering around 3.6 out of 7 points. 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
Goal Threat Strength Threat Tolerance
Attitude Category
A
tti
tu
d
e
 S
co
re
s
Treatment
High Frame
Low Frame
Generalized Attitudes Towards Protest by Article Treatment Group
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
Least Favored Most Favored
Movement Treatment
T
o
le
ra
n
ce Article
High
Low
Interaction Effects Between Article and Most/Least Treatment on Generalized Tolerance
28 
 
Table 7: Article Treatment Effects on Generalized Attitudes Toward Protest 
 Treatment Group   
 High Frame Mean Low Frame Mean Diff. in Means P Value 
Goal Threat 3.62 3.59 0.03 0.65 
 (0.05) (0.05)   
Strength Threat 4.41 4.61 -0.20 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05)   
Tolerance 5.66 5.69 -0.03 0.74 
 (0.06) (0.06)   
N 504 441   
 
Table 7: Tests of means between article treatment groups displaying the effects of the article treatment 
on goal threat, strength threat, and tolerance scales. 
 
Table 8: Movement Treatment Effects on Generalized Attitudes Toward Protest 
 Treatment Group   
 Most Favored Mean Least Favored Mean Diff. in Means P Value 
Goal Threat 3.52 3.68 -0.16 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05)   
Strength Threat 4.60 4.41 0.18 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05)   
Tolerance 5.78 5.57 0.20 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06)   
N 464 481 945  
 
Table 8: Tests of means between movement treatment groups displaying the effects of the movement 
treatment on goal threat, strength threat, and tolerance scales. 
 
The data also support Hypothesis 3.2, as significant article treatment effects appear in 
responses to general questions about protest strength. Responses among the low treatment group 
are about .2 points higher than responses among the high treatment group—this difference, 
though small, suggests that some article treatment effects linger as respondents indicate their 
opinions toward protest as a whole. As with hypothetical strength threat, general strength threat 
seems to be higher among those exposed to a hypothetical scenario about their most favored 
group if they were also exposed to the low-treatment article. Movement treatment effects and 
article treatment effects are about the same size (-.2 and .18 respectively, p<5%). 
Hypothesis 3.3 is not supported by the data. No significant article treatment effects on 
tolerance appear between high and low article treatment groups, as shown by Table 7. Table 9 
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confirms that the effect of the article treatment is not significantly different than zero. Therefore, 
the data confirm that the first two parts of the proposed mechanism extend to general opinions 
toward protest but do not actually impact tolerance toward protest. The movement treatment, 
however, does affect tolerance toward protest in general: tolerance dropped by about .2 points 
when respondents had previously considered a protest by a group they disliked (p<.05). 
Table 9: Effect of Treatments and Demographic Variables on Generalized Attitudes 
Toward Protest 
 Scales 
 Goal Threat Strength Threat  Tolerance 
Intercept 2.82 *** 4.63 *** 6.41 *** 
 (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.19)  
High Article Frame -0.02  -0.02  0.10  
 (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.11)  
Most Favored Group -0.23 ** 0.37 *** 0.38 *** 
 (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)  
High Intensity Frame x 
Most Favored Group 
0.08  -0.30 ** -0.26  
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.16)  
Female 0.11  0.34 *** -0.17 ** 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
Conservatism Score 0.20 *** -0.16 *** -0.26 *** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Income 0.03  -0.05 * -0.01  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Age -0.01  -0.02  0.10 ** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
N 927  926  927  
R2 0.11  0.10  0.32  
 
Note: P<.01 = ***, P< .05 = **, P<.1 = * 
Table 9: Regression table showing effects of article treatment, movement treatment on goal threat, 
strength threat, tolerance toward protest generally. Treatments represented as dummy variables; also 
shows interaction effects between treatments. 
  
 Lastly, the study finds no evidence in support of Hypothesis 3.4. The data suggest a 
negative, not positive, interaction effect on tolerance between the high article frame and the most 
favored group treatment. Figure 5 displays the direction of this effect. This relationship is almost 
significant at the 10% level—with a roughly .1005 p-value—but is not quite significant enough 
to fall below a .1 critical value. The study may have been too underpowered to detect the effect. 
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Figure 6: Differences in means between article treatment effect groups for all 
measures. Differences calculated as mean of high-intensity article treatment 
group minus mean of low-intensity article treatment group. Whiskers display 
95% confidence intervals. Note significance of article treatment effects for 
the first three points displaying attitudes toward the protest described in the 
treatment article.  
Figure 7: Differences in means between movement treatment effect groups 
for attitudes toward hypothetical protest, attitudes toward protest generally. 
Differences calculated as mean of most-favored group treatment group minus 
mean of least-favored group treatment group. Whiskers display 95% 
confidence intervals. Note large treatment effects on attitudes toward 
hypothetical protest, small carryover effects on attitudes toward protest 
generally. 
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Discussion 
This study investigated a proposed micro-level mechanism through which exposure to the 
protest paradigm might increase, not decrease, tolerance toward protest. Respondents exposed to 
an article characterized by the protest paradigm—that is, an article treating protest as non-serious 
and ineffectual—might feel less threatened by the ability of protesters to enact controversial 
goals, even if their perception of those goals themselves did not change. This mechanism might 
link data suggesting an increase in tolerance toward protest over the past half century with the 
data suggesting an increase in tolerance toward protest in the last three decades. Increasing 
prevalence of the protest paradigm might have lowered the perceived threat presented by 
protests; this, in turn, might have increased tolerance toward protest. 
The Mechanical Turk experiment provides mixed results. The first portion of the 
experiment, dealing with respondent attitudes toward the Occupy Wall Street protest described in 
the article, aligns closely with the hypothesized mechanism. The results of the second portion of 
the experiment, which asks respondents to imagine a protest by either a favored or disfavored 
group, does not align with the hypothesized mechanism; indeed, results support an alternate 
mechanism, tying shifts in protest tolerance with changes in the types of political or social 
groups using protest. Results from the third group of questions—concerning protest generally—
also support these group-based changes, as respondents who imagine a protest by their least 
favored group show less tolerance toward protest when later asked about protest generally. The 
implications of these tests are discussed below. 
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Treatment Effects on Attitudes Toward Occupy Wall Street Protest 
 
 Results from the first group of questions support the hypothesized model. The support for 
the model—at least in this section—is robust both because of the clear impact of the treatments 
on tolerance as well as the differing levels of impact of the treatment on each of the two threat 
categories. The treatment did not impact goal threat: highlighting less-serious aspects of the 
protest did not affect how threatened respondents felt by the goals of the protesters. Respondents 
may have also already been familiar with the goals of the Occupy Wall Street movement. The 
treatment did, however, clearly affect strength threat; multiple regression analysis shows that 
treating respondents with a low-intensity frame article instead of a high-intensity frame article 
raised their strength threat responses by about half a point. Muting the protest paradigm by 
removing references to a “party-like feel” to the protest, focusing less on protesters’ costumes 
(such as “cardboard birthday cake[s]”), and describing the protest’s reception by bystanders all 
likely made the protest seem more effective to the survey respondents. These adjustments also 
did not seem to impact respondents’ perceptions of the goals of the protesters themselves. These 
results suggest articles employing the protest paradigm make protests seem less effective—and 
indeed, less politically relevant—to media consumers. 
 Respondents receiving a high frame also had more tolerant responses than those receiving 
a high frame. This result, while seemingly counterintuitive, supports the model hypothesized 
earlier in the study, especially when interpreted in conjunction with goal and strength threat 
responses. Respondents seemed more likely to tolerate a less “effective” protest, even if their 
perceptions of the goals of the protest itself did not change. These results flip many of the 
assumptions surrounding the protest paradigm on their heads; a more “negative” portrayal of a 
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protest may actually increase public tolerance toward the protest if it undermines the perceived 
effectiveness or seriousness of the protest. This result, of course, does not suggest that the protest 
paradigm has made political protest a better political tool; indeed, it suggests the opposite. It 
suggests that less-serious protests are more likely to be tolerated, if not directly supported, as 
they are seen as less of a threat to the status quo.  
 
Treatment Effects on Attitudes Toward Hypothetical Protest 
 
 Results from the second and third sections of the experiment conflict with the first section 
and necessitate future research. Unlike the results gathered from the article-specific questions, 
the results gathered from the hypothetical and general question groups offer little support for the 
hypothesized mechanism. Indeed, treatment effects disappeared during the hypothetical portion 
of the experiment. Neither favorability group was impacted by the treatments. Large differences, 
however, exist between favorability groups. That is, respondents react less tolerantly toward 
hypothetical protests by groups they strongly dislike than groups they like, regardless of which 
article treatment they receive. 
Work by Marcus et al. (1995), as well as related literature by Sullivan, Piereson, and 
Marcus (1993), may help explain the lack of treatment effects in the hypothetical section of the 
survey experiment. This study uses a measure of goal and strength threat similar to that 
developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, though this work does not solely focus on 
tolerance toward protest—rather, it investigates mass tolerance toward a wide range of speech. 
While experiments by Sullivan et al. and Marcus et al. do find correlations between threat 
and tolerance, they only find connections between tolerance and goal threat (1993, 188; 1995, 
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102). Marcus et al. state that goal threat—that is, how threatening the respondent finds the goals 
of the group themselves—weighs much more heavily in evaluations of general tolerance than 
does the strength or effectiveness of the group. Indeed, though Marcus et al. find clear links 
between goal threat and tolerance, they find nearly no link between strength threat and tolerance, 
leading them to conclude that strength threat is irrelevant to tolerance completely. 
The hypothetical section of this experiment found a similar phenomenon. Respondents 
clearly displayed much more tolerance toward a hypothetical protest by a group they liked than a 
hypothetical protest by a group they did not like. Indeed, differences between goal threat posed 
by most and least favored groups are extreme: around a 3.28-point difference in evaluations of 
goal threat between most and least favored groups existed within both treatment groups. These 
differences carried over into the tolerance portion of the section, with roughly a 2 point 
difference in the mean tolerance measure between most and least favored group protest tolerance 
within each treatment group. The treatment groups themselves did not have any significant effect 
on tolerance. This result, coupled with the previous analyses by Marcus et al. (1995) and 
Sullivan et al. (1993) confirms the importance of goal threat over strength threat with regard to 
tolerance. 
 The article and hypothetical sections of the experiment, therefore, pose problems when 
interpreted together due to their conflicting results. The salience of each article may have simply 
faded from respondents’ minds the further they continued into the survey, and exposure to 
controversial groups may have especially impacted participants’ responses. Respondents’ 
evaluations of their attitudes may have also changed after exposure to the hypothetical. That is, 
respondents’ feelings regarding a protest by their most or least favored group may have been 
much more extreme than their feelings connected with protest efficacy as depicted in the article. 
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This disparity may have muted any framing effects remaining from the treatment. Respondents 
may have also evaluated each set of questions fundamentally differently. When dealing with 
specifics (i.e. a real protest about which they read) respondents may have taken into account 
more information and framing cues from the articles. When forced to rely on their own 
preconceptions about protest—whether through imagining a hypothetical or by accessing some 
general attitude toward protest—they might discount any information or impressions received 
from the article, as their feelings about the specific news story and their generalized attitudes 
toward protest may have occupied different mental “spaces” and thus have been accessed 
separately at different times over the course of the survey. 
 
Treatment Effects on Generalized Attitudes Toward Protest 
 
 The third section of the experiment, asking respondents about their opinions toward 
protest generally, provides perhaps the most striking results. The article treatment had no 
carryover effect on responses on general questions. Movement treatment, however, did affect 
respondents’ general attitudes toward political protest. Respondents presented with a 
hypothetical concerning their least favored political movement earlier in the study were later less 
tolerant toward protest generally—even though no reference to any group was made in these 
general questions. 
  These results also indicate that perceptions of protest may be tied to the types of groups 
seen as typically using political protest as a tactic. (Boyle et al. 2005).  As the types of groups 
typically associated with protest become less threatening (or, possibly, as threatening groups 
abandon protest as a tactic), tolerance toward protest may increase. The findings of Marcus et al. 
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(1995) and Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1993) discussed in the previous section partially 
explain this potential effect. The goals of protest groups—and the threat associated with those 
goals—factor much more strongly into tolerance than does the effectiveness of the groups 
themselves. This previous work cannot explain on its own, however, why negative or positive 
associations with a hypothetical protest carried out by a specific protest group might translate 
into negative associations with protest in general. Some other mechanism must be at play that 
spurs subjects to generalize and associate the specific with the general. 
 Adding Kahneman and Tversky’s availability heuristic (1973) to the analysis helps 
explain the impact of the movement treatment on answers in the following section. Subjects 
employing the availability heuristic judge a phenomenon based on immediately cognitively 
accessible examples of the phenomenon. Participants in this experiment, therefore, might have 
made judgments about political protest based on the most readily accessible example of protest 
in their mind: the example the study had prompted them to imagine Tied to this example were 
either extreme positive or negative attitudes (the same attitudes that caused the wide divergence 
between favorability groups in the hypothetical section). These attitudes then slipped into 
subjects’ generalized responses as they accessed the most cognitively available example of 
protest. 
 These results might also be more closely related to the setup of the experiment than with 
any externally valid effects. General questions directly followed hypothetical questions in the 
survey design. The hypothetical portion of the test, therefore, might have been more prominent 
in the minds of respondents. The intensity of respondents’ attitudes toward either their most or 
least favored groups might also have overridden any lingering effects of the article treatment. 
Any potential effect of the article might have been lost by the time the respondent reached the 
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last section of the survey. More investigation of the carryover effects identified by this 
experiment is needed; further research should distinguish quirks of the experimental design from 
actual shifts in tolerance due to goal threat and the availability heuristic. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study investigates the links between media framing and tolerance toward protest. It 
tests a proposed connection between tolerance and media frames using a survey experiment. The 
results of the first section of the experiment, measuring attitudes toward the specific protest 
mentioned in the treatment article, conflict with the results from the next two sections. Subjects 
treated with an article in which the protest paradigm was apparent thought the protest was 
weaker; they also gave more tolerant responses, on average, than respondents in the other 
treatment group. After adding the second treatment, however, article treatment effects 
disappeared. These results indicate that subjects’ tolerance toward protest depend on the type of 
protest they considered—that is, whether a protest is conducted by a group they like or a group 
they dislike. Even when questions made no reference to any specific protest, this movement 
treatment impacted subjects’ responses. 
 Further research should be conducted investigating the conflicting results from the 
differing sections of the experiment. The protest paradigm may indeed only affect attitudes 
toward specific protests, and leave general attitudes toward protest unaffected. Opinions toward 
protest as a whole might stem more from the types of groups seen protesting, as opposed to the 
specific tactics of these groups—or the ways in which those tactics appear in the news media. 
Some research, such as a longitudinal study of print news by Boyle et al. (2005), suggests that 
the types of groups which protest have become less radical, while the ways in which the media 
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represent protest have remained the same. This trend aligns more closely with the results of the 
second half of the experiment, and suggests that the rise in tolerance toward protest depends 
more on a change in the types of groups which protest as opposed to the ways in which the 
media represent them. Further research should explore in more depth the potential interaction 
effects between protest group type and protest paradigm framing. 
 Research should also investigate the role of media other than print media in forming 
attitudes toward protests (and political movements more generally). This study focused on print 
media—other forms of media, like social and online media, have increased in popularity over the 
past decade. Survey data from the Pew Research Center indicate that around 48 percent of 
internet users now receive news from Facebook weekly, and 75 percent of internet users believe 
the internet keeps them better informed about national and international news (Mitchell et al. 
2014; Purcell & Rainie 2014). While print news media may use the protest and public nuisance 
paradigms to frame protest, new forms of media may employ these frames less often. These 
media sources may also convey information to consumers differently than conventional news 
sources—both in presentation and in content—and so may impact opinion differently than do 
more traditional news outlets. Investigating how media type impacts tolerance may help explain 
variation in tolerance levels left unexplained by this study. 
  
39 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
Table A1.1: Respondent Choices of Most and Least Favored Movements 
Group Type Most Favored Least Favored 
 N Percentage N Percentage 
Christian fundamentalists 88 9.31 166 17.57 
Pro-life activists 96 10.16 30 3.17 
Far-left activists 75 7.94 36 3.81 
White supremacists 2 0.21 346 36.61 
Pro-choice activists 178 18.84 19 2.01 
Muslim fundamentalists 3 0.32 185 19.58 
Feminists 169 17.88 33 3.49 
Atheists 258 27.30 46 4.87 
Far-right activists 19 2.01 66 6.98 
Anti-immigrant activists 52 5.50 18 1.90 
No response 5 0.53 0 0 
 
Table A1.1: Most and least favored political groups selection for Mechanical Turk sample. Second and 
fourth columns display absolute numbers in each category; third and fifth columns display percentages. 
Respondents favored atheists, feminists, and pro-choice activists, and disliked white supremacists, 
Muslim fundamentalists, and Christian fundamentalists. 
 
Table A1.2: Summary Statistics for Demographic Variables (Within-Question Percentages) 
 Treatment Group  
  
High Article, 
Most Favored 
Group 
High Article, 
Least Favored 
Group 
Low Article, 
Most Favored 
Group 
Low Article, 
Least Favored 
Group 
Total 
Gender      
Female 44.9 41.3 46.3 47.6 45.0 
Income Bracket      
Less than $20,000 18.7 21.5 21.7 20.2 20.5 
$20,001 to $40,000 29.6 31.3 23.7 30.5 29.0 
$40,001 to $65,000 26.8 24.0 21.7 25.8 24.7 
$65,001 to $105,000 17.1 16.7 26.1 19.3 19.5 
$105,001 and above 7.8 6.5 6.8 4.3 6.4 
Age Bracket      
18 to 29 years old 35.0 31.6 38.6 34.6 34.8 
30 to 41 years old 35.0 41.7 38.2 41.0 38.9 
42 to 53 years old 18.7 13.8 14.0 13.2 15.0 
54 to 65 years old 10.5 11.7 8.2 9.8 10.2 
66 years old or older 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.1 
Conservatism Score      
Mean on 7-Point 
Scale (7 = Extremely 
Conservative) 
3.327 3.335 3.317 3.145 3.281 
 
Table A1.2: Summary statistics for Mechanical Turk sample. Columns indicate treatment subgroup. 
Statistics displayed as percentages except for conservatism score, which is displayed as a mean. 
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Appendix 2: Article Section Regressions 
Table A2.2: Multiple Regression of Article Treatment Effect on Strength Threat with Treatment 
as Ordinal Variable (High = 0, Low = 1) 
 Model 1  Model 2  
     
Intercept 3.9272 *** 4.3999 *** 
 (0.037)  (0.1223)  
Low Treatment 0.4837 *** 0.4761 *** 
 (0.0542)  (0.0537)  
Female   -0.0569  
   (0.0547)  
Conservative Score   -0.098 *** 
   (0.0163)  
Income Bracket   -0.0167  
   (0.0224)  
Age Bracket   -0.0111  
   (0.0272)  
N 942  928  
R2 0.07806  0.1164  
P<.01 = ***, P< .05 = **, P<.1 = * 
 
Table A2.1: Multiple Regression of Article Treatment Effect on Goal Threat with Treatment as 
Ordinal Variable (High = 0, Low = 1) 
 Model 1  Model 2  
     
Intercept 3.2607 *** 2.0786 *** 
 (0.0535)  (0.1593)  
Low Treatment 0.0284  0.0684  
 (0.0784)  (0.0699)  
Female   -0.0158  
   (0.0712)  
Conservative Score   0.3403 *** 
   (0.0212)  
Income Bracket   0.0833 *** 
   (0.0293)  
Age Bracket   -0.0705 ** 
   (0.0355)  
N 944  930  
R^2 0.000139  0.2302  
P<.01 = ***, P< .05 = **, P<.1 = * 
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Table A2.3: Multiple Regression of Article Treatment Effect on Tolerance Score with 
Treatment as Ordinal Variable (High = 0, Low = 1) 
 Model 1  Model 2  
     
Intercept 4.706 *** 5.172 *** 
 (0.045)  (0.1469)  
Low Treatment -0.5836 *** -0.5943 *** 
 (0.0657)  (0.0645)  
Female   -0.0169  
   (0.0657)  
Conservative Score   -0.1484 *** 
   (0.0195)  
Income Bracket   -0.007  
   (0.027)  
Age Bracket   0.0335  
   (0.033)  
N 941  927  
R2 0.0774  0.1321  
P<.01 = ***, P< .05 = **, P<.1 = * 
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Appendix 3: Survey Text 
 
Mechanical Turk Full Survey Questionnaire 
 
Question Responses (Single Selection) 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as 
a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? 
1. Democrat 
2. Republican 
3. Independent 
4. Other party 
If Democrat: Would you call yourself a strong 
Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
1. Strong 
2. Not very strong 
If Republican: Would you call yourself a strong 
Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
1. Strong 
2. Not very strong 
If Neither Democrat nor Republican: Do you think of 
yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the 
Democratic Party? 
1. Closer to Republican 
2. Neither 
3. Closer to Democrat 
Are you registered to vote? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
How often do you pay attention to what’s going on in 
government and politics? 
1. Always 
2. Most of the time 
3. About half the time 
4. Some of the time 
5. Never 
 
Question Responses (Multiple Selection) 
Please indicate whether you did any of the following 
activities during the 2012 elections for any candidate or 
party: Check all that apply. 
 
1. Talked to any people to try to get them to vote 
for or against one of the parties or candidates 
2. Went to any political meetings, rallies, or 
speeches in support of a particular candidate 
3. Wore a campaign button, put a campaign 
sticker on your car, or placed a sign in your 
window or yard 
4. Did any other work for one of the parties or 
candidates 
5. Contributed money to an individual candidate 
running for office 
6. Contributed money to a political party 
7. Contributed money to any other group that 
supported or opposed candidates 
Please indicate whether you have done any of the 
following activities during the past 4 years: Check all 
that apply 
1. Joined in a protest march, rally, or 
demonstration 
2. Attended a meeting of a town or city 
government or school board 
3. Signed a petition on the Internet about a 
political or social issue 
4. Given money to a religious organization 
5. Given money to any other organization 
concerned with a political or social issue 
6. Called a radio or TV show about a political 
issue 
7. Written a letter to a newspaper or magazine 
about a political issue 
8. Contacted or tried to contact a member of the 
U.S. Senate or U.S. House of Representatives 
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Question Most/Least Favored Groups Selection 
This next question will ask you to choose your MOST 
and LEAST favored groups out of a list of ten groups. 
Please only select one most favored group and one 
least favored group. 
1. Christian fundamentalists 
2. Pro-life activists 
3. Far-left activists 
4. White supremacists 
5. Pro-choice activists 
6. Muslim fundamentalists 
7. Feminists 
8. Atheists 
9. Far-right activists 
10. Anti-immigrant activists 
 
Question (Attention Check) Responses 
When talking about the news media, we find that our 
survey subjects receive their news from a number of 
different sources. Please only select the fourth option. 
Selecting any other option will disqualify you from 
continuing with the survey. 
1. Newspapers 
2. Radio 
3. Cable News (CNN, Fox, MSNBC) 
4. News Blogs and Internet News 
5. Other television news (ABC, NBC, etc.) 
6. Social Media (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) 
 
Question Responses (Single Selection) 
In talking to people about elections, we often find that 
a lot of people were not able to vote because they 
weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't 
have time. Which of the following statements best 
describes you in 2012? 
1. I did not vote 
2. I thought about voting in 2012, but didn't 
3. I usually vote, but didn't this time 
4. I am sure I voted 
5. I was not old enough to vote in 2012, but am 
now eligible to vote 
6. I was not eligible to vote in 2012, and am still 
not eligible to vote 
What is your race? 
1. White 
2. Black or African American 
3. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
4. Asian 
5. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
6. Hispanic or Latino 
7. Other 
What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Other 
What is your age range? 
1. 18 - 29 years old 
2. 30 - 41 years old 
3. 42 - 53 years old 
4. 54 - 65 years old 
5. 66 years old or older 
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and 
conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the 
political views that people might hold are arranged 
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. 
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or 
haven't you thought much about this? 
1. Extremely liberal 
2. Liberal 
3. Slightly liberal 
4. Moderate; middle of the road 
5. Slightly conservative 
6. Conservative 
7. Extremely conservative 
8. Haven't thought much 
This question is about your family's total income in 
2013, before taxes. This figure should include income 
from all sources, including salaries, wages, pensions, 
1. Less than $20,000 
2. $20,001 - $40,000 
3. $40,001 - $65,000 
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Social Security, dividends, interest and all other 
income. What was the total income of your family in 
2013? 
4. $65,001 - $105,000 
5. $105,001 and above 
 
[Participants are exposed to either the High or Low frame article. They are reminded that payment is not contingent 
upon answers to attitudinal questions, but failure to correctly answer factual questions (marked with an asterisk) will 
terminate the survey and forfeit payment. The text of each article can be read in Appendix A of this document] 
 
Question (Attention Check) Responses 
Which of these landmarks was mentioned in the 
article? 
1. City Hall 
2. Chamber of Commerce 
3. New York Stock Exchange 
 
Question Description Statements Responses (1 to 7 Likert Scale) 
These next statements will refer 
to the specific protest about 
which you read. Please select 
the option that best reflects 
your attitude toward the 
following statements. 
 
 
 
I found the protest bothersome. 1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
I think the protest could be effective. 
I found the protest unpatriotic. 
These next statements will refer 
to the specific protest about 
which you read. Please select 
the option that best reflects 
your attitude toward the 
following statements. 
 
The protestors are peaceful. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
The protestors are dangerous. 
The protestors are trustworthy. 
The protestors are unpredictable. 
The protestors are honest. 
Say members of the group 
about which you have just read 
plan to hold a similar protest in 
your town or city. Please select 
the option that best reflects 
your attitude toward the 
following statements. 
 
I would support allowing this group to 
hold a protest. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
I would support an ordinance restricting 
such protests. 
I would defend the expressive rights of 
these protesters to a friend. 
I would support the police in shutting 
down such a protest. 
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A representative from this protest group 
should be allowed to address a crowd. 
Please select the option that 
best reflects your attitude 
toward the following 
statements. 
 
This is a strong protest movement. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
This is an unimportant protest 
movement. 
This protest movement seems easy to 
ignore. 
This protest movement seems likely to 
become popular. 
This protest movement seems likely to 
accomplish its goals. 
These next few questions will 
not refer to the group about 
which you read. They will 
instead refer to members of a 
different group, [The name of 
either the participant’s most or 
least favored group will appear 
here]. Please select the option 
that best reflects your attitude 
toward the following 
statements. 
 
[Group type] are peaceful. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
[Group type] are dangerous. 
[Group type] are trustworthy. 
[Group type] are unpredictable. 
[Group type] are honest. 
Say that members of [the 
hypothetical organization name 
of the participant’s most or 
least favored group appears 
here – a list of these names can 
be seen in Appendix 4 of this 
document], a [most/least 
favored group] group, planned 
to hold a demonstration similar 
to the one about which you 
read. Their behavior and tactics 
would be very similar to those 
of the protest group described 
in the article that you read. 
Please select the option that 
best reflects your attitude 
toward the following 
statements. 
 
This would be a strong protest 
movement. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
This would be an unimportant protest 
movement. 
[Group name] would be easy to ignore. 
This protest movement would be likely 
to become popular. 
[Group name] would be likely to 
accomplish its goals. 
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Please select the option that 
best reflects your attitude 
toward the following 
statements. 
 
I would support allowing [group name] 
to hold a protest. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
I would support an ordinance restricting 
a protest by [group name]. 
I would defend the expressive rights of 
[group name] protesters to a friend. 
I would support the police in shutting 
down such a protest by [group name]. 
A representative from [group name] 
should be allowed to address a crowd. 
These next questions will ask 
you about protest generally. 
Please select the option that 
best reflects your attitude 
toward the following attitudes. 
 
Protesters are peaceful. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
Protesters are dangerous. 
Protesters are trustworthy. 
Protesters are unpredictable. 
Protesters are honest. 
Please select the option that 
best reflects your attitude 
toward the following 
statements. 
Protest movements are strong. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
Protest movements are unimportant. 
Protest movements are easy to ignore. 
Protest movements are likely to become 
popular. 
Protest movements are likely to 
accomplish their goals. 
Please select the option that 
best reflects your attitude 
toward the following 
statements. 
 
I support allowing groups to hold 
protests. 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
I would support an ordinance restricting 
protest. 
I would defend the expressive rights of 
protesters to a friend. 
I support the police in shutting down 
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protests. 
Representatives from protests should be 
allowed to address crowds. 
 
Question Description Statements Responses (1 to 7 Likert Scale) 
Please select the option that 
best reflects your attitude 
toward the efficacy of the 
following political strategies. 
Professional lobbying 1. Highly Ineffective 
2. Moderately Ineffective 
3. Slightly Ineffective 
4. Neither Effective Nor 
Ineffective 
5. Slightly Effective 
6. Moderately Effective 
7. Highly Effective 
Petitions 
Voting in a state or local election 
Contributing to a political campaign 
Public protest 
Voting in a national election 
 
End survey 
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Appendix 4: Article and Movement Treatments 
 
Appendix 4a: Article Treatments 
 
High-Intensity Frame Article 
Anniversary brings smaller Occupy party  
Hundreds of Occupy Wall Street protesters took to the streets in Lower Manhattan on Monday to celebrate the one-
year anniversary of the populist social movement that has struggled for relevance in recent months.  
 
A New York police spokesman said 181 protesters were arrested as they marched and chanted throughout the city's 
financial district and tried - and failed - to form a human blockade around the New York Stock Exchange. Most were 
charged with disorderly conduct.  
 
Legba Carrefour, a D.C. activist in New York for the events, called the morning activity "underwhelming," citing the 
four mini-marches through the streets.  
 
A party-like feel ruled the day, dubbed "S17 Resistance," as several hundred descended upon the concrete canyons of 
the financial epicenter where they had set up camp in New York's Zuccotti Park and demanded a reckoning for Wall 
Street's role in the country's financial crisis. The camp was cleared a month later. A smaller-than-expected group of 
protesters chanted their now famous rallying cry "We are the 99 Percent," sang "Happy Birthday," and scampered 
from intersection to intersection throughout the financial district. One woman even came dressed up as a cardboard 
birthday cake.  
 
The New York City Police Department had a huge presence in the area, setting up checkpoints for financial workers 
that the Occupiers dressed up in suits tried to sneak through. 
 
Adam Herschenfeld, 23, who was on his way to his first day of work at investment advisory firm Buckman, Buckman 
& Reid, shared his impression of the protests. 
 
"This is my first day at work and the cops won't let me down on Wall Street without a pass. I had to call my boss to 
come get me," he said. "After seeing the costumes and the singing and dancing—if I wasn't trying to get to my job, I 
would be very entertained.'' 
 
 
Low-Intensity Frame Article 
 
Anniversary brings smaller Occupy protest 
 
Hundreds of Occupy Wall Street protesters took to the streets in Lower Manhattan on Monday to celebrate the one-
year anniversary of the populist social movement that changed the country's political discourse.  
 
A New York police spokesman said 181 protesters were arrested as they marched and chanted throughout the city's 
financial district and tried to form a human blockade around the New York Stock Exchange. Most were charged with 
disorderly conduct.  
 
Legba Carrefour, a D.C. activist in New York for the events, said that the protest caught fire later, with as many as 
four mini-marches through the streets.  
 
Several hundred descended upon the concrete canyons of the financial epicenter where they had created such a 
firestorm last year by setting up camp in New York's Zuccotti Park and demanding a reckoning for Wall Street's role 
in the country's financial crisis. The camp was cleared a month later but not before the movement had spread to dozens 
of cities across the country, including the District. A group of protesters chanted their now famous rallying cry "We 
are the 99 Percent” and marched from intersection to intersection throughout the financial district. 
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The New York City Police Department had a presence in the area, setting up checkpoints for financial workers and 
protesters. 
 
Ed Needham, a member of Occupy Wall Street's media relations and communications team, rejected the idea that 
Monday would be more of a feel-good reunion than a reigniting of passion that has died in recent months. 
 
"I don't think there's much nostalgia at all," Needham said. "It's really revisiting the issues of debt and financial 
disparity that have propelled the social movement this far." 
 
Adam Herschenfeld, 23, who was on his way to his first day of work at investment advisory firm Buckman, Buckman 
& Reid, had a similar impression of the protests. 
 
"I remember the Occupy protests from last year, and I’m not surprised to see them back in action," he said. "If protests 
like these continue, I could see them really changing things in Washington.'' 
 
Original Article 
 
Anniversary brings smaller Occupy party 
 
Hundreds of Occupy Wall Street protesters took to the streets in Lower Manhattan on Monday to celebrate the one-
year anniversary of the populist social movement that changed the country's political discourse  but has struggled for 
relevance in recent months.   
 
A New York police spokesman said 181 protesters were arrested as they marched and chanted throughout the city's 
financial district and tried - and failed - to form a human blockade around the New York Stock Exchange. Most were 
charged with disorderly conduct.  
 
Legba Carrefour, a D.C. activist in New York for the events, called the morning activity "underwhelming"  but said 
that the protest caught fire later, with as many as four mini-marches through the streets.   
 
A party-like feel ruled the day , dubbed "S17 Resistance," as several hundred descended upon the concrete canyons 
of the financial epicenter where they had created such a firestorm last year  by setting up camp in New York's Zuccotti 
Park and demanding a reckoning for Wall Street's role in the country's financial crisis. The camp was cleared a month 
later but not before the movement had spread to dozens of cities across the country,  including the District.A smaller-
than-expected  group of protesters chanted their now famous rallying cry "We are the 99 Percent," sang "Happy 
Birthday,"  and scampered from intersection to intersection   throughout the financial district. One woman even came 
dressed up as a cardboard birthday cake.   
 
The New York City Police Department had a huge presence in the area , setting up checkpoints for financial workers 
that the Occupiers dressed up in suits tried to sneak through.  
 
Ed Needham, a member of Occupy Wall Street's media relations and communications team, rejected the idea that 
Monday would be more of a feel-good reunion than a reigniting of passion  that has died in recent months, as camps 
were shuttered, ranks dwindled and the cause lost popular mainstream support.  
 
"I don't think there's much nostalgia at all," Needham said. "It's really revisiting the issues of debt and financial 
disparity that have propelled the social movement this far." 
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Appendix 4b: Movement Treatments 
 
Note: Each most/least favored group has a corresponding group name. These names are listed below. 
 
Group Type Group Name 
Christian fundamentalists Christian Nation 
Pro-life activists Right to Life 
Far-left activists People’s Liberation 
White supremacists White Pride 
Pro-choice activists Right to Choose 
Muslim fundamentalists Hizb al Islam 
Feminists Women United 
Atheists Atheists United 
Far-right activists Constitutional Heritage Party 
Anti-immigrant activists Americans First 
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